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Reforming the Supreme Court
Roger C. Cramtont
Life tenure for Supreme Court Justices has had harmful consequences
that could not have been foreseen by the Founders. The seriousness of
these harms makes it necessary and proper to use the hindsight we enjoy
today to correct them. This Article begins with a brief summary of the
constitutional provisions relevant to judicial tenure and examines how the
system of life tenure functions today. The harmful consequences of life
tenure are then examined, leading to the conclusion that a statutory
solution is required. The article then proposes such a solution and
examines its constitutionality, concluding that language, history and
purpose support the conclusion that Congress has legislative authority to
enact the needed statutory reform.
I
THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE GOOD BEHAVIOR CLAUSE
AND THE COMPENSATION CLAUSE

Article III, Section I of the Constitution provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in Office.
The Founders knew of the long struggle of their English ancestors to
obtain a judiciary that, although appointed by the crown, was not
subservient to either the executive or legislative branches of government.
As Blackstone put it, if judges were subservient to the ministers of the
Copyright © 2007 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
publications
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government, "the life, liberty, and property [of citizens] would be in the
hands of arbitrary judges."' In 1776, the Declaration of Independence
proclaimed as a grounds for independence of the colonies that King George
III had "made [colonial] Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure
of their offices, and offices, and the amount and payment of their
salaries.",2 In contrast, the constitutions of at least three colonies - Virginia
(1776), Maryland (1776), and Massachusetts (1780) - provided that judges
hold office "during good behaviour." 3 Other colonial constitutions
provided for a limited term of office (eight years in New York) or for life
tenure with removal by action of the legislature. Today, however, all state
constitutions reject life tenure for their high court judges, providing instead
for limited tenure through age limits, term limits or removal by address of
the legislature.
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 and the state ratifying
conventions indicate that the Founders intended the Good Behavior Clause
and the Compensation Clause to provide a federal judiciary that would
exercise independent judgment in deciding cases, free from influence or
control of the political branches of the federal government - the President
and Congress. As James Wilson stated to the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention, "the servile dependence of the judges [who are appointed and
perhaps reappointed after five or seven years, as in some colonies]
endangers the liberty and property of the citizen." 4 Opponents of the
Constitution, such as Brutus, recognized that federal judges would be
"independent, in the fullest sense of the word," but thought this unwise:
...[there is] no authority that can remove them, and they can not
be controuled by the laws of the legislature. In short, they are
independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power
under heaven. Men placed in this situation
5 will generally soon feel
themselves independent of heaven itself.
Hamilton, in defending the Good Behavior Clause in Federalist No.
78, replied that "the permanent tenure of judicial offices" would provide
judges with the "independent spirit" essential to their "faithful
performance" of their constitutional duty to keep the legislative branch of a
limited government "within the limits assigned to their authority."6 In
1. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES 259-60 (1768), quoted in PHILIP B. KURLAND &
LERNER,
4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 132 (1987) [hereinafter FOUNDERS'

RALPH

CONSTITUTION].
2.
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
3.
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 1,at 133. The Virginia Constitution also provided for
"fixed and adequate salaries." Id. The Maryland Constitution spelled out that tenure during "good
behaviour" meant that they were "removable only for misbehavior, on conviction in a Court of law."

Id.
4.
5.
6.

See id. at 139 (quoting from Elliot's Debate in Pennsylvania, Dec. 1987).
Id. at 141 (quoting THE ANTI-FEDERALIST No. 15 (Brutus)).
Id. at 142-43.
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Federalist No. 79, Hamilton argued that the Compensation Clause was also
vital to judicial independence because "a power over a man's subsistence
amounts to power over his will."'7 Salaries, however, should be subject to
increase because "judges, who, if they behave properly, will be secured in
their places for life" may serve a long time and a stipend sufficient at the
8
beginning may prove inadequate later.
Reflecting the circumstances of the time, Hamilton stated reasons why
the Good Behavior Clause would not result in extremely long service or
"in the imaginary danger of a superannuated bench." 9 Most men did not
survive that long: "few there are who outlive the season of intellectual
vigor." Of those who did, the "deliberating and comparing faculties
generally preserve their strength."'
The Founders acted at a time when experience with constitutionmaking was limited to the recent experience of the colonies. They accepted
judicial review of legislative and executive action as an abstract idea but
did not and could not know how its practice would evolve. They also had
little experience with life tenure for judges in 1789 (the colonies mandating
life-tenure for judges had acted subsequent to the Declaration of
Independence). And judicial review of legislative action was outside the
authority of British judges who had been given life tenure earlier in the
eighteenth century to increase their independence from the King and his
ministers in adjudicating cases.
Moreover, the Founders had no conception of government service as a
lifetime job. Only a century later, with the establishment of the civil
service, did the concept of lifetime public office become possible. The
Founders believed that public service was the duty of intelligent and
propertied individuals who would serve in government office for a period
before returning to their home, family, and original employment, just as
George Washington would return to his plantation at Mount Vernon and
John Adams to his farm in Brookline. Furthermore, the principle of
rotation in public office governed all other branches of the federal
government: Representatives were elected for two-year terms; Senators for
six-year terms; and Presidents for four-year terms, with any continuance in
office dependent upon re-election.
The Founders, therefore, anticipated many of those appointed to the
Supreme Court would resign to pursue other activities or would die after
relatively short periods of service. As a result, new appointments would
occur with some frequency. This was indeed the case throughout most of

7.
8.
9.
10.

FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 144.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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the nation's history.' 1 Since 1789, the average age of appointment to the
Court has been fifty-three, with most appointees falling between age fifty
and fifty-five. Until 1970, Justices resigned or died at an average age of
sixty-eight, thus serving an average tenure of about fifteen years. A new
Justice joined the Court about every two years. The rotation in office
contemplated by the Founders was the general rule, sometimes speeded by
an expansion in the size of the Court or the threat of such expansion. 12
Since 1970, however, although the average age of appointment has
not changed, the average tenure in office has increased to almost twentysix years (an increase of eleven years) and will likely increase further
without any changes. The average age in leaving office has also risen
eleven years, from age sixty-eight to age seventy-nine. No new
appointment to the Court occurred between 1994 and 2005, the longest
period without change since the Court's size was fixed at nine Justices. The
lengthening tenure of Justices has nearly doubled the time between
appointments from 1.7 years prior to 1970 to 3.3 years since. Prior to 1970,
almost every President serving a four-year term received at least one
appointment to the Court. Since then, three of the last seven four-year
presidential terms have had no appointments to the Court.
The language and history of the Good Behavior Clause, viewed in the
light of the circumstances of the time, establish two propositions: (1) the
Clause was intended to establish a judicial branch that would be
independent from executive or legislative control; and (2) the Founders
expected that vacancies on the Supreme Court would arise in a frequency
that would prevent "superannuation" and result in fairly frequent
appointment of new Justices.
II
REASONS FOR LONGER TENURE ON THE COURT

The ability of modem medicine to keep elderly people alive, even
after they after developed life-threatening diseases, is part of the reason
that turnover on the Court has decreased since 1970. The Founders lived at
a time in which life expectancy at age 45-55 was probably less than fifteen
11.
The source of the data in this and the following paragraph is Steven G. Calabresi & James
Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J. Pun. POLICY
769, 777-87 (2006) [hereinafter Calabresi & Lindgren]. Other sources contain very similar figures but
there are inevitable variations because of differences in dealing with unusual circumstances (e.g., does
the length of service of Charles Evans Hughes, who was appointed twice to the Court with an
intervening period when he was not on the Court, count as two separate terms or one extended term?).
12.
The Supreme Court has varied in size from six Justices at the outset to a high often Justices
during the Civil War, but has been stable at nine Justices since 1870. President Roosevelt's 1937
proposal to expand the Court to as many as sixteen Justices was precipitated by a series of decisions
striking down New Deal legislation by 5-4 votes in his first term of office. The legislation,
characterized by opponents and the media as "court packing," was abandoned when a change in Justice
Roberts' voting pattern upheld legislation early in the President's second term.
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years (it had grown to only eighteen years in 1900).13 During the twentieth
century, however, longevity at birth increased about three years per decade
and this trend continues. Today, a Supreme Court appointee of average age
(50-55) can expect to live thirty or more years after appointment-about
twice as long as the individual would have lived in 1800.14 Two other
factors, however, are much more important than increased
longevity: (1) the fact that the Court now controls its own workload;
and (2) reluctance on the part of Justices to relinquish the power and
celebrity accompanying the office.
A. Control over Workload
In the early twentieth century, when many litigants had a right to
appeal a federal question to the Court, the Justices were in the same
position as are the judges of the lower federal courts today: they were
overwhelmed by a heavy and steadily increasing caseload of mandatory
appeals. On lower federal courts, increasing caseloads can be dealt with by
the creation of new judgeships. But since this expansion of decisional
capacity always lags behind the increasing dockets, judges of those courts
often take senior status or retire because the constant caseload pressure is
time consuming and ultimately tiresome.
The same situation faced the Supreme Court Justices in the early
decades of the twentieth century. In response to the Court's complaints that
mandatory appeals were overwhelming the Court, Congress in 1925
instituted the certiorari process. The gradual abandonment of almost all
mandatory jurisdiction gave the Court increasing control over its docket by
1980. The result was a steady reduction in the number of cases decided on
the merits. Instead of deciding as many as 350 cases per year, the Court has
gradually reduced its caseload to no more than 100 cases involving about
70-75 opinions for the Court. Each Justice is now responsible on average
for 8-9 opinions for the Court per year.
Meanwhile, very able staff assistants (four law clerks per Justice
rather than the one clerk of the era of Holmes and Brandeis) support the
Justices. Justices increasingly delegate research and writing of opinions in
varying degrees to the law clerks, who also do the unpleasant detail work
involved in nearly all jobs. The failure of some Justices to fully engage in
the work of the Court, as was the case with Thurgood Marshall in his later
13. See Robert Pear, Social Security Underestimates Future Life Spans, Critics Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/3 l/politics/31 benefit.html?.
14. See National Center of Health Statistics, LEWK3, United States Life Tables, 1999-2002
(providing the remaining life expectancy for persons who have attained age 50: Entire population: 30.3
years; White females: 33.3 years; White males: 28.5 years; Black males: 24.6 years). Moreover, the
ability of modem medicine allows a person who gets the best available medical care to continue to
exercise very important responsibilities despite severe coronary problems (e.g., Vice President Cheney)
or life-threatening bouts of cancer (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg).
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years, 15 is often known to insiders but not widely reported by the press.
Members of the Court have no legal obligation to provide health
information to the public and only incidents involving disabilities evident
in court proceedings or unusual absences from the bench are reported. The
Court's reduced workload also leaves many important issues of federal law
resulting in different rules being applied to different
unresolved, sometimes
16
parts of the nation.
B. Increase in the Power and Saliency of Supreme Court Decision Making
Federal judges are eligible for "senior status" after a combination of
age and years of service. Most lower court federal judges make this
election when eligible because it allows them to have a reduced and more
flexible workload. Supreme Court Justices, however, only rarely take
senior status when eligible to do so, primarily because they are reluctant to
give up the great power that now rests in the office. The Constitution the
Justices interpret is extremely difficult to amend - perhaps more difficult to
amend than any other on the planet. As a result, the word of the Justices is
the last word on many important social and political questions. A Justice of
the Supreme Court, therefore, occupies one of the most powerful offices in
the nation, and only the Justices serve for an unlimited term.
The political prominence of the Court and its Justices has also steadily
grown in recent decades. In each of the last six presidential elections the
identity of persons or types of person the rival candidates might appoint to
the Court has been an important issue. In the 2000 election, the Court7
decided who would be the person to appoint some of its own members.'
Supreme Court appointments have become politically contentious not only
because Justices exercise great power, but because they exercise that power
for so long.
The Founders, in providing for tenure during "good behavior," did not
contemplate that life tenure would accentuate the tendency of Justices to
consider themselves as Platonic Guardians for American society.' 8 In
15. See David J. Garrow, Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical Case
for a 28th Amendment, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 995, 1072-80 (2000) [hereinafter Garrow] (stating that "far
and away the most serious problem with decrepitude during the early 1990s involved Justice Thurgood
Marshall" and fully documents his assertion).
16. The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System studied this problem
and recommended the creation of a National Court of Appeals between the Supreme Court and the
AND
INTERNAL
See
the
Commission's
REPORT, STRUCTURE
Courts
of
Appeal.
PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 5-39 (June 1975). I believe the recommendation was

sound and that the problem is even more serious today.
17. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
18. Judge Learned Hand, who raised doubts about the legitimacy of judicial review in 1958,
applied the term "Platonic Guardians" to the Justices of the Court. The Court, in his view, had become
a third, legislative, chamber." "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not." See LEARNED HAND, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
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Federalist No. 78 Hamilton expressed views about the Court that are
quixotic in the light of contemporary reality.1 9 The Court, he stated, would
be "the least dangerous" branch of the federal government because it had
neither the sword of the executive nor the purse and law-making powers of
the legislature. The federal judiciary, Hamilton famously said, has "neither
Force nor Will but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the
aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments., 20 Hamilton
described a Court that would parse judicial precedent and resolve narrow
legal questions with rare legal skill; he stated that the major qualification
for appointment would be the knowledge acquired by "laborious study" of
existing precedents.21
No one today believes, as Hamilton said, that Justices are "bound
down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point out
their duty in every particular case that comes before them., 22 That narrow
view of the judicial function, especially as descriptive of the current policyoriented decision making of the Court, is quaint but totally inaccurate.
C. Increased Celebrity Status
In addition to their current exercise of significant power, Supreme
Court Justices also enjoy a celebrity status. Justices are featured in major
stories in newspapers and magazines and cited in law review articles by
academics who agree with their views.23 They are honored guests at
Washington events and diplomatic gatherings and are invited by a wide
variety of educational institutions and organizations, domestic and
international, to make appearances or give prestigious lectures, some
involving compensation as well as reimbursement of expenses; and they
receive honors and awards from these organizations. The Court's calendar
(approximately one month free in the winter and two months during the
summer) leaves Justices free to enjoy domestic and foreign travel and the
accompanying celebrity. Justice O'Connor, for example, reported taking
twenty-eight trips in 2004 for which she received reimbursement for
expenses, four of them to foreign countries. The Court's schedule is
convenient enough so that Justice Stevens, at age eighty-four, can live in
Florida and commute to Washington by plane for the days of oral argument
and the weekly conference. The honors and attention surely have a
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), quoted in FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
19.
supra note l, at 141-44. See L.H. Lame, Neither Force Nor Will, 12 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY
179-82 (1995), which I have drawn upon here.
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 142.
20.
Id. at 143.
21.
22.
Id.
See, e.g. Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin
23.
Scalia, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/
2005/supremesconfidence.
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tendency to contribute to feelings of self-importance and may make
Justices less inclined to retire from the Court.
The office of being a Justice of the Supreme Court is probably the
most powerful office in the nation other than those of the President, the
Speaker of the House, and the Senate Majority Leader. Only the Justices
serve for an unlimited term. Andrew Jackson, in an 1829 message to
Congress, stated a profound truth: those who hold public office on a
continuing basis tend to consider the office "as a species of property. 24
Rotation in office, he argued, was an essential principle of ordered liberty.
Until the twentieth century, and especially since 1970, the lifetime tenure
of Justices resulted in a vacancy arising every two years and service on the
Court averaged about fifteen years.
III
THE HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF LIFE TENURE

The current concerns of life tenure for Justices did not clearly emerge
until the twentieth century and became particularly evident after 1970. The
Constitution provides only one explicit mechanism by which the political
branches (the President and Congress) may influence the Supreme
Court: the appointment process. Justices are nominated by the President
and confirmed by the "advice and consent of the Senate. ' 5 This process,
when it occurs with some frequency, helps make the Court aware of and
accountable to the will of the people. Although Justices, like other federal
officers, may be removed by the cumbersome process of impeachment, an
attempt to use this process early in our history failed. 6 No Justice has been
removed by impeachment and there is general agreement 27that serious
misconduct, such as committing a felony, must be established.

24.

President Andrew Jackson's Message to Congress, December 1829, quoted in LEONARD D.

WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 308-09 (4th ed. 1955).
25.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 provides: "[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein provided for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest the
appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments."
26.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has explored the early attempt to impeach Justice Samuel Chase.
See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUEST: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL

CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992) (discussing the politically motivated impeachment
of Justice Chase and concluding that its failure fortified judicial independence).
27.

See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 9-26

(Aug. 1993) (concluding that Art. III judges may be removed only by impeachment and recommending
that a statute provide for automatic suspension of duties when a judge is convicted of a felony). For
subsequent discussion of the evolution of federal appellate justice, see RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE
INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Arthur D. Hellman

ed., 1990).
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Exercise by Congress of its legislative authority to regulate the size,28
jurisdiction,2 9 structure, procedure, and terms of employment of Justices or
other Article III judges is constitutionally permissible, at least within broad
limits, but often comes with unwelcome consequences. Denying the
Supreme Court authority to exercise jurisdiction over a particular subject
matter, for example, may leave conflicting decisions of the lower federal
courts in place. Legislation denying jurisdiction to any federal court has the
effect of leaving in place possibly conflicting state court decisions of
federal constitutional questions. These unwelcome 30consequences make
such proposals unattractive and politically dangerous.
The drastically decreased turnover of Justices since 1970, however,
has substantially reduced the effectiveness of the appointment process in
keeping the Court in touch with popular will. With rare exceptions, Justices
in the twentieth century have remained on the Court until they die in office,
become physically or mentally decrepit, or decide to retire when a
President in office is likely to appoint a Justice with similar political views.
The result is that decisions having great moment for the nation's future are
made by Justices whose appointments came many years before and who
may not be influenced by, or even knowledgeable about, the views of those
voters who are members of generations other than that of the most elderly.
None of these developments could have been foreseen by the Founders.
Furthermore, the problem is magnified because a vacancy arises either
unpredictably by a Justice's death or deliberately by a Justice's decision to
retire. And the timing of Justices' retirement is frequently motivated by a
desire to have a like-minded successor appointed.3 1 Since early in the
twentieth century some of these events have clustered together, resulting in
oscillating periods of very little turnover with those of very quick turnover.
Because vacancies are uneven over time but sometimes are bunched, one
President may make five appointments in a four-year term and others make
none.

32

28. The Court was created in 1789 with six members; a seventh was added in 1807; an eighth
and ninth Justice was added in 1837; a tenth was added in 1863; two seats were eliminated in 18661869; and a ninth seat restored in 1870. Since then the Court has not changed in size. See HENRY J.
ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS AND SENATORS 53-96 (Rev. ed. 1999).
29.
For extensive discussion of statutory regulation of federal court jurisdiction and its
limitations, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM Chapters 1-5 (5th ed. 2003).
30.
Efforts to make Justices work harder or with less assistance may have unintended and
undesirable consequences and have a vindictive or petty quality. For example, a reduction of law clerks
from the current four to the former one would put a much larger burden on each Justice and especially
so if more mandatory jurisdiction was also required; and complaints would be made that it handicapped
the Court's ability to exercise its constitutional duties.
31.
See infra text accompanying note 34.
32.
President Taft made five appointments in his four-year term (plus the appointment of an
existing Justice as Chief Justice) and President Harding made four appointments. On the other hand,
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Current arrangements create perverse incentives that may result in a
transient political majority controlling Supreme Court decisions for a
generation or more: the randomness over time of the death of Justices may
lead to one President getting three appointments in a four-year term (as
President Nixon did) and another none (President Carter's experience). It is
surely possible, for example, that President Bush will have more
nominations before the end of his current term. If he does, and one of the
retiring Justices was a liberal member of the Court, a six-member
conservative faction might control constitutional decision making for
decades.
Also, Presidents have a strong incentive to appoint younger but likeminded appointees, although this has happened only infrequently as yet
(Justice Thomas, who was forty-three when appointed, is the most recent
example).33 More significant has been the attempt of many Justices since
1970 to obtain the appointment of a like-minded successor.34 Chief Justice
Warren, for example, sought belatedly to have President Johnson choose
his successor, but he had waited too long and President Nixon got the
appointment.3 5
The attempt of Justices to hold their office until a like-minded
President would make the appointment has contributed substantially to the
increasing instances of Justices becoming physically or mentally decrepit
in their final years on the Court.36 Justice Black attempted to survive the
Nixon presidency, and Justice Douglas attempted to survive both Nixon
and then Ford, but both Justices failed.37 Justices Brennan and Marshall
attempted to survive Reagan, and they also failed. Justice Blackmun, on
the other hand, succeeded in surviving until the Clinton administration.
There is strong evidence that all five were physically or mentally impaired

during their last years on the Court.3 8 All harmed the Court because it was
President Carter made no appointments in a four-year term and three recent presidents made no
appointments during their first term in office (FDR, Clinton and the second Bush).
33. See Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 11, at 800-801 (stating that the average age of Justices
when they are appointed or commissioned has remained relatively constant throughout history (ranging
between 52 and 57 years since 1821)).
34. Id. at 801-811 (providing impressive statistical evidence that retirement decisions of Justices
are strongly influenced by a desire to influence the appointment of a successor: nearly two thirds of
resigning Justices (34 of 53) retired during the term of a president of the same party. On the other hand,
of Justices who died in office, 60% (29 of 48) did so during the term of a President of the opposing
party (they tried but failed to survive the term of a President of the opposing party)).
35. See Philip D. Oliver, Systematic Justice:A Proposed ConstitutionalAmendment to Establish
Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the United States Supreme Court, 47 OHIO ST. L. J. 799, 80506 (1986) (relying on judicial biographies of Chief Justice Warren by G. Edward White and Bernard
Schwartz).
See Garrow, supra note 15. See DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH: SUPREME
36.
COURT JUSTICES AT THE END (Kansas 1999) [hereinafter ATKINSON].

37. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 11, at 807.
38. Id. at 815-18. The evidence relies on the detailed discussion of individual justices in
Garrow, supra note 15, and ATKINSON, supra note 36. Garrow presents strong evidence that at least
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operating under a situation in which several Justices were operating by rote
and decisional power was sometimes improperly influenced by another
Justice or by law clerks.
This harm has even been recognized by Justices themselves. In one
situation, that of Justice Douglas, who became mentally impaired in his last
years, the Court, by a 7-1 vote in a conference held without notice to
Douglas, determined that it would not count the Douglas vote if his vote
determined the outcome. 39 That sensible, but perhaps lawless action, is an
indicator of the serious problems caused by the current life tenure system.
In short, the primary political influence on the Court-the
constitutionally-required process by which the elected representatives of
the people appoint Justices - is applied irregularly, infrequently and
haphazardly. And the attempt of numerous Justices to delay retirement has
harmed the Court, even when health problems prevent them from most
effectively carrying out their functions in an effort to ensure the
appointment of a like-minded successor. All of these factors have had
another long-term consequence: they have increased the contentiousness of
confirmation proceedings and undermined the public's conception that the
Court is an independent branch exercising "judicial" rather than "political"
authority. Enactment of an appropriate and valid statutory solution is
necessary. It is now desirable to renew the Supreme Court through a
proposal that would limit their service on the sitting Court to eighteen
years followed by lifetime service in a lower federal court.
IV
THE TERM OF SERVICE ON THE COURT SHOULD BE LIMITED EITHER BY
STATUTE OR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

A. A Statutory Proposal
A variety of proposals have been made over the years, most involving
40
constitutional amendments that would provide age limits or term limits.
Age limits primarily address mental or physical decrepitude but do so
indirectly and in a heavy-handed manner that discriminates on the basis of
age. An appointment to a limited term of office, in connection with a
particularized inquiry into health, is a better response. Term limits also
eleven justices have continued to serve when they were physically or mentally incapacitated. Even
more worrisome, "nearly half of the last eleven Justices to leave office (45%) were mentally decrepit
and a half of the last six Justices to leave office were mentally decrepit in their last years on the Court."
Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 11, at 817.
39. See Garrow, supra note 15, at 1053-54.
40. For a well-considered term limits proposal, see Philip D. Oliver, Systematic Justice:A
Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the United

States Supreme Court, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 799 (1986). For an age limits proposal, see Garrow, supra note
15.
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have the advantage of largely eliminating the adverse effects of the
randomness in the creation of new appointments. If appointees serve out
the full term, vacancies will arise frequently and regularly. The regularity
of appointments would prevent the clustering of appointments that
sometimes can create a majority on the Court that was not built on a solid
foundation of a series of electoral victories.
Equally important, term limits eliminate or reduce most of the major
forms of strategic behavior that flow from the current life tenure
arrangements. A President no longer would have an incentive to appoint
younger Justices and would feel free to appoint a more qualified older
lawyer or judge whose age and health would suffice to complete the fixed
term of years. Terms limits also largely eliminate the ability of Justices to
influence the appointment of their successors through the timing of a
resignation.
Because the Constitution is so difficult to amend, serious
consideration should be given to statutory alternatives. Although some
constitutional law scholars believe that any statutory approach is
inconsistent with the Good Behavior Clause, Paul Carrington and I are
among the many who disagree. My views on the subject are stated below,
and those of Carrington in his article. 4'
Our proposal defines the office of being a Supreme Court Justice in a
way that limits participation of each Justice on the Court to about eighteen
years followed by lifetime service on a lower Article III court. 42 It has won
the support of about forty-five eminent constitutional law and federal
courts scholars.43 The nonpartisan nature of the proposal is evidenced by
the fact that it is endorsed "in principle" by a large group of scholars who
are identified politically as ranging across a broad spectrum - liberal,
centrist and conservative. They are persuaded that current arrangements are
causing serious problems that will only get worse and that change is
needed now.
Specifically, we propose that the President appoint one and only one
new Justice during each term of Congress, with the nine Justices who are
junior in commission serving as the active members of the Court. The
proposal would result in a tenure on the sitting Court of eighteen years,
which is longer than the historical average of fifteen years. Senior Justices
would retain their title and compensation for life. After completion of the
period of service on the sitting Court, Justices would continue to serve in
accordance with the Good Behavior Clause of Article III by performing
Paul D. Carrington, Checks and Balances: Congress and the FederalCourts, in REFORMING
t, at 137.
in its current form may be found at the following
42. The proposal
website: http://paulcarrington.com/Supreme/e%20Court%2ORenewal%2OAct.htm. A full list of those
endorsing the proposal is included.
43. Id.
41.

THE COURT, supra note
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judicial duties in circuit courts, much as Justices were required to do during
most of the nineteenth century. If needed to provide a nine-member Court,
the Senior Justice junior in commission would be recalled to the Court to
serve until the next term of Congress, when the new appointment would be
made. Senior Justices would also participate in the Court's procedural rulemaking authority; their involvement with the lower federal courts would be
helpful in the Court's consideration of the procedural rules of those courts.
The fundamental purpose of the Good Behavior Clause was to ensure
judicial independence from control by the political branches of the federal
government. An eighteen-year term of service free from any control by the
executive and legislative branches would protect judicial independence as
well as the system of life tenure does. And the elimination of the strategic
behavior encouraged by the current system would provide more protection
against improper influence by Justices, Presidents and Senators than is the
case now. The need for legislation to rectify the problems created by life
tenure is becoming generally recognized and is long overdue. We summon
Congress to address it and ask you to support it.
B. Constitutionalityof a Statutory Solution
Congress has broad authority, among other things, to create and
abolish federal courts (other than the Supreme Court), 4 determine the
jurisdiction of federal courts (providing an uncertain minimum jurisdiction
is left to the Supreme Court), 45 establish rules regulating federal courts,
provide the terms of employment of judges subject to the Compensation
Clause, and prescribe procedures by which the federal judiciary may
discipline itself. The Supreme Court's appellate (as distinct from original)
jurisdiction is exercised "with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations, as the Congress shall make. 46 The constitutional limitations
on this legislative authority are that the regulation must not violate the
prescribed methods for appointment and removal of Article III judges and
must be consistent with the judicial independence protected by the Good
Behavior and Compensation Clauses of Article III, Section 1, discussed at
the beginning of this article.

44.
Discussed infra at text accompanying note 54.
45.
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER AND DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2003). Id. at 28-54 (brief
summary), at 268-3 18 (original jurisdiction), at 466-600 (review of state court decisions), at 1552-1621
(review of federal decisions and certiorari policy).

46.

U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2.
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47

1. CircuitRiding

The legislative requirement that Supreme Court Justices hear and
decide cases in inferior federal courts began with the Judiciary Act of 1789
and lasted for more than a century; the final steps in the demise of circuit
riding were taken by the Judiciary Act of 1911. The practice imposed
extreme hardship on Justices, especially in the first half of the nineteenth
century when long distance travel was so difficult and onerous. 48 From the
very beginning the Justices complained about the circuit-riding
requirement and sought legislative relief from Congress. These pleas were
rejected until late in the nineteenth century and became more compelling
only when burgeoning caseloads threatened to overwhelm the Court.
Members of Congress had good reasons to require circuit riding: it brought
federal Justices into contact with citizens throughout the nation; it gave the
Justices valuable experience in trying and deciding appeals in lower courts;
and it familiarized them with the practice and problems of lower federal
courts.
In the initial years of circuit riding, several Justices (e.g., Jay and
Marshall) wrote private letters stating or suggesting that the practice was
unconstitutional. 49 But when a case questioning the constitutionality of
circuit riding came before the Court in 1803, a unanimous Court rejected
the argument that the practice was unconstitutional and circuit riding
continued as a requirement for most of the remainder of the century.
Circuit riding also had another consequence. A vacancy on the Court
was associated with a particular circuit and the person appointed would
"ride circuit" in that part of the country. This statutory requirement
provided a practical limitation on the President's Article II power of
appointment. Usually the President had to appoint a lawyer or judge from
that circuit rather than make a selection from a nationwide pool, as is now
the case.

47. See Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 1753 (2003) [hereinafter Glick]. This article provides a good summary of the history
of circuit riding, its purposes and effects, and the Court's attempts to eliminate it. The article also cites
much of the prior literature on the subject.
48. For letters from Supreme Court Justices complaining about the burdensome nature of the
long travel by carriage throughout the breadth of the country, see FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra
note 1, at 163 (letters of Chief Justice Jay on behalf of the Court and of Justice James Iredell).
49. Chief Justice Jay drafted a letter dated on behalf of the Court to President Washington
attacking the constitutionality of circuit riding. See id. at 161-62. The letter, dated Sept. 15, 1790, was
never delivered. The letter contains the two principal arguments advanced by the appellant in Stuart v.
Laird, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 299 (1803), and discussed below: (1) cases decided by the Justices on circuit
were not within either the original or appellate jurisdiction of the Court and the duties were
incompatible because the Supreme Court was required to review appeals from the circuit courts;
and (2) circuit riding required the Justice to hold two offices at one time and they had not been
appointed by the President to the circuit court as required by Art, II, § 2.
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Vestiges of circuit riding remain: each Justice is assigned by the Court
to a circuit and hears applications for temporary relief from that circuit;5"
and a retired Justice "may be designated to perform such judicial duties in
any circuit, including those of a circuit Justice, as he is willing to
undertake."'', At least eight retired Justices have utilized this provision
since 1950; Justice Clark, for example, spent the last ten years of his life as
a circuit court judge. 2
53

2. Stuart v. Laird
In 1802, a Republican Congress and President Jefferson abolished the
circuit courts created by a Federalist Congress and President Adams by the
Judiciary Act of 180 1.54 New circuit courts and judgeships replaced them.

None of the circuit court judges appointed by the Federalists were
reappointed to the new courts, leaving sixteen Article III judges with no
cases to decide. Although none of the judges who lost their offices attacked
the constitutionality of the 1802 legislation, those questions were raised in
Stuart v. Laird.55 A foreign creditor had obtained a judgment against a
Virginia debtor in a circuit court created in 1801. When the creditor sought
to enforce the judgment in the circuit court established by the 1802
legislation, Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as a circuit judge, upheld the
judgment. In the appeal to the Court in Stuart the judgment debtor asserted
several constitutional questions concerning the power of Chief Justice
Marshall, acting as a circuit Justice, to enforce a judgment that, it was
argued, should have been enforced by the life tenure judges appointed to
the Virginia circuit under the 1801 legislation. The questions briefed and
argued were as follows:
First, could judges entitled to "hold their Offices during good
Behaviour" 56 be deprived of that office without an impeachment
50.

28 U.S.C. § 42 (1948).

51.

Id. § 294(a).

52.

See Glick, supra note 47, at 1830-31 (listing Justices who have served in lower federal

courts after retiring from the Supreme Court).
53.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). Stuart is discussed in David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: The Powers of the FederalCourts, 1801-1835,49 U. CHI. L. REv. 646, 662-63 (1982),
and Glick, supra note 47, at 1794-1829.
54.
2 Stat. 132 (Mar. 8, 1802).
55.
The Jeffersonian legislation was accompanied by a large polemical and political literature.
Alexander Hamilton, when the legislation was pending, argued that, even if Congress could abolish and
recreate the circuit courts, it could not "abolish the emoluments of the office," which were retained
during good behavior. See FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 166-67, 175-79 (reprinting
Hamilton's THE EXAMINATION, Nos. 6, 12, and 13 (1802)). The constitutionality of the legislation was
vigorously debated in the House of Representatives. Hamilton argued that "the Office is something
different from the Court" and "the one may exist independently of the other." Id. at 175-77. Moreover,
"affirm[ing] the right of Congress to abolish the Judges of the Inferior Courts is absolutely fatal to the

independence of the Judiciary department" because "the tenure of an office is one of its essential
qualities." Id. at 178.

56.

U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 3.
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proceeding? The judgment enforced by Chief Justice Marshall while
"riding circuit" was invalid, the judgment debtor contended, because the
displaced circuit court judges were deprived of their office without being
removed by impeachment, in violation of the Good Behavior Clause. This
argument was countered by reliance on other language of the same section
of Article III that authorized Congress to vest the judicial power "in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." Although the Court's decision affirming the judgment below
raised, argued and rejected this constitutional question, Justice Paterson's
opinion dealt only with the power of the court enforcing the judgment and
not explicitly with the abolition of a court with previously created
judgeships. The Court held, 5-0, with Chief Justice Marshall not
participating, that Congress had constitutional authority to replace a
previously existing court with another one and "to transfer a cause from
one such tribunal to another., 57 The opinion contains strong language of
congressional authority to create, modify or abolish federal courts and their
jurisdiction: ". . . there are no words in 58the constitution to prohibit or
restrain the exercise of legislative power.,
Second, could a statute authorize Supreme Court Justices to hear and
decide cases in a lower federal court? This argument took two
forms: (1) the statute assigning circuit duties to Justices effectively
appointed them as circuit judges in contravention of Article II's provision
that appointments were to be made by the President with the Senate's
consent; and (2) Justices could not sit on circuit because the cases they
would try there were outside the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction as
defined by Article III. These are two aspects of the same question: Does
Congress have legislative authority to mix the duties of one judicial office
with that of another? Or, put another way, is the "office" of federal judges,
including that of Supreme Court Justices, subject to legislative
modification or redefinition? Justice Paterson's opinion in Stuart upheld
the power of Congress to require Justices to ride circuit but did so without
replying to the opposing arguments: the "practice [of circuit riding], and
acquiescence under it [by members of the Court], for a period of several
years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an
irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.... Of course,
the question is at rest, and ought now to be disturbed." 59
If a practice, begun by a Congress in which many of its members were
from the Constitutional Convention and all were familiar with the debates
concerning its adoption, had become "settled" after twelve years of circuit
riding, fixing the meaning of the Constitution, it is surely part of the
57.
58.
59.

Stuart, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 309.
Id. at 308.
Id. at 309.
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constitutional firmament after existing for more than 121 years with its
constitutionality unquestioned. If "originalism" has any force, it must be
applicable in this situation.6 °
61

3. Abolition by Statute of Existing Federal Courts and Judgeships

On three occasions during the first seventy-five years of U.S. history
(1802, 1812 and 1863), Congress abolished federal courts with the effect of
leaving duly appointed Article III judges without any cases to decide. In
the first instance (repeal by the Jeffersonian Congress in 1802 of the
Federalists' Judiciary Act of 1801), discussed above, sixteen judges
appointed to the circuit courts created in 1801 were essentially deprived of
their office. The judges protested the constitutionality of the Act to
Congress, but they did not bring any judicial proceeding seeking relief. The
constitutional questions, however, were raised and rejected in Stuart v.
Laird, discussed above.
The second instance occurred in 1812 when Congress passed the act
admitting Louisiana as a state in the union and created a district judgeship
for the state. The 1804 legislation that established the Territory of Orleans
in what became Louisiana had provided a district judge with the same
jurisdiction and authority as district judges in a state. When the territorial
government ended, the judgeship was abolished. However, in this instance,
President Madison appointed the same person to the judgeship created by
the statehood act.
The third instance was in 1863 when Congress abolished the circuit
court and the criminal court for the District of Columbia and replaced them
with the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia. The three judges of
the circuit court for the District of Columbia served with life tenure and the
legislation abolished the three judgeships. In effect, the three judges were
removed from office by legislation abolishing their court and creating a
new one. None were appointed to the new court.62 The background in this
instance was the Civil War and the concern of President Lincoln and

60. Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 11, at 859-868 (discussing the constitutionality of
statutory proposals). An earlier version of the article took the position that their statutory proposal,
similar to the Carrington-Cramton proposal, was constitutional. The final version reaches the contrary
conclusion, arguing that the text of the Good Behavior Clause and the clause of Art. 1, Sec. 3, that "the
Chief Justice shall preside" when the Senate tries a President in an impeachment proceeding, when read
together, make the office of a Supreme Court Justice that is unique and distinctive and therefore circuit
riding, designation permitting service on lower courts, and prohibit successive service on a lower court
after a term of years on the high court are unconstitutional. They argue that the "originalist" position is
that the First Congress, the Marshall Court (with Marshall recusing himself because of his involvement
in the case), Stuart v. Laird, and the unquestioned continuance of the practice for 121 years are all
wrong. Circuit riding was an unconstitutional practice and should not be relied upon today.
61.
This commentary relies in part on information provided by Bruce Ragsdale, Chief Historian,
Federal Judicial Center.
62.
Id.

HeinOnline -- 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1329 2007

1330

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1313

Congress that one or more of the judges were Confederate sympathizers.
Also in 1863, Congress abolished the judgeship for the U.S. Circuit Court
for the Circuit of California, although there was no incumbent judge at the
time.63
The three instances, plus the Court's holding in Stuart, provide
support for the view that Congress may essentially remove lifetime tenure
judges by abolishing the court they serve on.64
4. Subsequent History
There are no decisions subsequent to Stuart that directly raise the
issue of the constitutionality of a statute that requires an Article III judge to
exercise responsibilities on more than one constitutional court or on the
Supreme Court and an inferior Article III court. Two fairly recent
decisions, however, discuss the constitutionality of statutes that mix the
duties of an office subject to the president's Article II appointment
authority. Morrison v. Olson upheld the constitutionality of the
independent prosecutor legislation against a separation-of-powers attack.65
The Court stated that the validity of the legislation turned on "whether the
Act, taken as a whole, violates the separation of powers by unduly
interfering with the role of the Executive Branch" 66 and concluded that
impermissible interference was not involved.
That conclusion seems even more self-evident in a situation in which
a President is appointing an officer (an Article III judge) who is required
by statute to exercise judicial duties on more than one constitutional court.
The President and the Senate know the duties in advance, all duties are
judicial in character, and the required duties do not unduly interfere with
the president's appointment authority.
Mistretta v. United States is another relevant precedent. 67 The Court
held that the legislation creating the United States Sentencing Commission
did not violate the separation-of-power principle either by requiring federal
judges to serve on the Commission, sharing their authority with nonjudges, or by empowering the President to appoint Commission members
and to remove them for cause. The conclusion that the Constitution does
not prohibit Article III judges from undertaking extrajudicial duties was
63.
12 U.S. Stat. 794 (March 8, 1863).
64. The U.S. Commerce Court was created in 1910 to review decisions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Controversial from the beginning, it was abolished in 1913, leaving its judges
without judicial work. The appointees were selected from existing federal judges; but tenure on the
Commerce Court was limited to five years. Two of them, Julian Mack and Martin Knapp, were some
years later appointed to federal courts of appeal. Subsequent emergency courts have been staffed by
existing Article Ill judges. See George E. Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in
Institutional Weakness, 8 AM. J. LEG.HIST. 238 (1964).
65.

487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988).

66.
67.

Id. at 695-96.
488 U.S. 361, 397-412 (1989).
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68
supported by "the historical practice of the Founders after ratification."
The Court cited a number of instances in which Justices (including Jay,
Ellsworth and Marshall) had served in other capacities as a result of a
presidential appointment with the "advise and consent" of the Senate,
followed by numerous other examples throughout the years, including
Justice Jackson's service on the Nuremberg Tribunal in the aftermath of
World War II and Chief Justice Warren's leadership of the national
commission investigating the assassination of President Kennedy.69
In language even more pertinent to the mixing of judicial duties
involved in circuit riding and to the Carrington-Cramton proposal, the
Court said: "This contemporaneous practice by the Founders themselves is
separation of
significant evidence that the constitutional principle ' of
70
powers does not absolutely prohibit extrajudicial service."

5. JudicialDesignationand Discipline
A half-dozen sentences in the Constitution deal with the creation,
jurisdiction and regulation of federal courts. For many years Congress and
the federal judiciary have struggled to apply this constitutional language to
a federal judicial system that has currently grown to 853 authorized Article
III judges and carries on its judicial business with a total judicial
complement that far outnumbers the authorized Article III judges and their
senior status colleagues. 7' Nearly 3,000 judicial officers who do not have
life tenure handle a large portion of federal judicial business: 1,328
statutory judges (magistrates and bankruptcy court judges), twenty-nine
judges and senior judges of the Federal Court of Claims, and 1370
administrative law judges.72 Efficient utilization of the services of the
minority who are Article III judges and who select and supervise many of
the non-tenured judicial officers is a major endeavor.
One longstanding practice authorized by statute, and always assumed
to be consistent with the Constitution, involves the designation of Article
III judges to provide judicial services in a court other than that of initial
appointment.7 3 These designation practices further the efficiency of the
system and encourage the continuing involvement of Article III judges in
its work. By designation, a judge appointed by one federal court may
handle the judicial business of another: (1) retired Supreme Court Justices
and retired lower federal court judges may sit on other federal

68.
69.
70.
71.
Tenure, 26
72.
73.

Id. at 398.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 399.
See Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life
CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 601-02 (2005).
Id. at 602-11.
28 U.S.C. §§ 291-294(1948).
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courts; 7 4 (2) the Chief Judge of a Circuit Court of Appeals may designate
75
district judges to serve on appellate panels of the circuit court;
and (3) the Chief Justice and the Chief Judge of a circuit may designate a
lower court judge of one judicial circuit to serve in another circuit.7 6
Problems of misconduct in office by Article III judges or physical or
mental decrepitude interfering with the proper administration of justice
have led to statutory procedures by which complaints against judges of
U.S. district and circuit courts may be considered and remedied by action
through the respective circuit councils. 77 On rare occasions the cases
assigned to a judge have been reassigned and no new cases assigned,
leaving an Article III judge without any cases to decide.7 8 These methods
of judicial discipline, which are authorized by statute and implemented by
the federal judiciary, have withstood challenges to their constitutionality.
In Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit a district judge
sought relief by mandamus of an order of the judicial council of the Tenth
Circuit. 79 The order permitted the judge to complete cases filed before a
specified date but deprived him of all future cases. The judge had twice
expressed agreement with this order and a prior one, but, changing his
mind, he sought mandamus. The Court, in a 7-2 decision, denied the
application for mandamus on the ground that the case for extraordinary
relief had not been made. In doing so, Chief Justice Burger stated in
dictum:
[There is] no disagreement among us as to the imperative need for
total and absolute independence of judges in deciding
cases.... [But] Congress can vest in the Judicial Council the
power to enforce reasonable standards as to when and where court
shall be held, how long a case may be delayed in decision, whether
a given case is to be tried, and many other routine [administrative]
matters.80
This power, on the facts of Chandler, includes the denial of any new case
assignments to a duly appointed Article III judge.
Justice Harlan, in a lengthy concurrence, stated that the Court had
jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding and that, considering the case on its
merits, the circuit council order removing cases from the district judge did
not impair judicial independence and was a valid exercise of valid

74. Id. § 29 1(a).
75. Id. § 292(a).
76. Id. § 29 1(a), (d).
77. Id. §§ 351-364.
78. For discussion of judicial discipline and impeachment of federal judges, see Symposium,
Judicial Disciplineand Impeachment, 76 Ky. L.J. 633-810 (1987-88), especially papers by Stephen B.
Burbank and Ronald D. Rotunda.
79. 398 U.S. 74 (1970).
80. Id. at 84.
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authority. 81 Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting, agreed with Harlan that
the case was ripe for decision. Reaching the merits, they argued that the
order depriving the judge of any new cases effectively removed the judge
from office without an impeachment proceeding and violated the Good
Behavior Clause. In their view, the order impaired judicial independence
and could not be justified on grounds of efficient administrative
supervision. 82
Although these internal disciplinary mechanisms do not apply to the
Supreme Court, the Court at least in one instance in the twentieth century
determined that the vote of an impaired Justice would not be taken into
account if that vote would decide the case. 83
6. Interpretingthe Good Behavior Clause
The Carrington-Cramton proposal was designed with these elements
of current law and practice in mind. Thus, under the proposal a Senior
Justice continues to participate in the work of the Supreme Court in two
ways: (1) full participation until retirement or death in the rule-making
authority of the Court; and (2) the recall of a Senior Justice to fill a
temporary vacancy or to provide a full Court in situations of recusal or
temporary disability in the term or terms immediately following becoming
a Senior Justice. It is supported by a highly plausible reading of the
constitutional text, longstanding and consistent historical practices that
began with the First Congress, and modem legislation that provides a
judicial mechanism by which judges themselves may police judicial
behavior and reassign cases to maintain the efficiency of the federal
judicial system.
The circuit riding required of Supreme Court Justices in the
nineteenth century (a practice that led to some Justices retiring early) and
upheld by the Court in Stuart v. Laird establishes that today's Justices
could be required, for example, to spend three months per year handling
cases as a circuit or district court judge. The question, then, is whether
spreading the alternative constitutional court service over time is somehow
different from contemporaneous service.
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that "The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behavior .... ." This language can be read as drawing a distinction
between "Judges" of the Supreme Court and "Judges" of the inferior courts
even though both are entitled to life tenure. But this construction, reaching
the conclusion that tenure as a Supreme Court Justice must continue in that
capacity for life, is not a necessary reading. An equally plausible and
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 89-129 (Harlan J., concurring).
Id. at 129-142 (Douglas J., dissenting).
See Garrow, supra note 15, at 1054.
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straightforward interpretation would read it as requiring that "Judges" at
both levels must enjoy life tenure but that the office of each may include
not only contemporaneous service, as held in Stuart v. Laird, but
successive service that started in the Supreme Court and moved to a lower
court or vice versa. The text of the Good Behavior Clause does not separate
the "Judges" of the "Supreme Court" from those of the "inferior courts."
Instead, it lumps them together in the following language: "The judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour ...... Congress may define a judicial "Office" as
including service in both the Supreme Court and an inferior Article III
court.
Because the text of the Constitution is ambiguous, the choice between
two plausible interpretations should be influenced or controlled by a
purposive or functionalist reading of the Good Behavior Clause, read in
conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause. The function and
purpose of the Good Behavior Clause is apparent from the uniformity of
statements both of those supporting and opposing the Constitution: Its
purpose was to ensure that federal judges acted in a judicial capacity that
was not subject to the influence or control of the political branches of the
federal government. 84 "Judicial independence" has become the rubric for
an essential requirement: decisions of federal judges must be protected
from improper executive or congressional influence, approval or
retaliation. This purpose is served by a definition of judicial office that
guarantees life tenure and includes a lengthy and fixed term of service in
the judicial work of the Supreme Court.
The proposed statute is constitutional because (1) it provides for life
tenure on a constitutional court and (2) the term of full service on the
Supreme Court is lengthy, fixed in time, non-renewable and cannot be
affected by the political branches of government. The Carrington-Cramton
proposal protects judicial independence just as well as do current
arrangements.

84. See supra notes 5-8 for discussion of the statements of the founding generation (both those
supporting and opposing ratification of the Constitution) evidencing that judicial independence was the
purpose of the Good Behavior and Compensation Clauses.
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